EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION TO THE LOWEST UNIQUE POSITIVE INTEGER GAME
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium solution to the lowest unique positive integer game
Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a ...
متن کاملOn ‘ Reverse Auction : the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game
Received (received date) Revised (revised date) Accepted (accepted date) In Zeng et al. [Fluct. Noise Lett. 7 (2007) L439–L447] the analysis of the lowest unique positive integer game is simplified by some reasonable assumptions that make the problem tractable for arbitrary numbers of players. However, here we show that the solution obtained for rational players is not a Nash equilibrium and th...
متن کاملReverse Auction: the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game
A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique i...
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This study computationally examines (1) how the behaviors of subjects are represented, (2) whether the classification of subjects is related to the scale of the game, and (3) what kind of behavioral models are successful in small-sized lowest unique integer games (LUIGs). In a LUIG, N (≥ 3) players submit a positive integer up to M(> 1) and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by ...
متن کاملEquilibrium strategy and population-size effects in lowest unique bid auctions.
In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution as a function of the mean number of players, and compare them with a large data set of internet auc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Fluctuation and Noise Letters
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0219-4775,1793-6780
DOI: 10.1142/s0219477510000071