منابع مشابه
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متن کاملWarranties as signals under consumer moral hazard.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice
سال: 1983
ISSN: 1018-5895,1468-0440
DOI: 10.1057/gpp.1983.4