Equity preferences and abatement cost sharing in international environmental agreements

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper examines empirically the importance of equity preferences for formation international environmental agreements (IEA) transboundary pollution control. Although it has been shown theoretically that existence among countries considering an IEA increases chances and stability a coalition, empirical assessments such have limited to climate change mitigation single-country studies. We consider case marine plastic pollution, which large share consists food beverage containers, representing control problem increasing policy concern, with properties lead distinct considerations sharing abatement costs. employ coordinated choice experiment in United Kingdom States assess abatement-cost allocations plastics IEA. Pairs cooperating relative allocation costs are varied experimentally. Results show systematic aversion both advantageous disadvantageous inequality respect but also strength differs across countries. Across countries, there is evidence left-leaning voters generally favor more equal Differences these results from greenhouse gas emission reduction, implications current efforts establish legally binding global treaty on discussed.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Agricultural Economics

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['0002-9092', '1467-8276']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12392