ERRATA: "WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE"

Errata: "when aspiring and Rational Agents strive to Coordinate"

Endogenous selection of aspiring and rational rules in coordination games

The paper studies an evolutionary model where players from a given population are randomly matched in pairs each period to play a coordination game. At each instant, a player can choose to adopt one of the two possible behavior rules, called the rational rule and the aspiring rule, and then take actions prescribed by the chosen rule. The choice between the two rules depends upon their relative ...

Learning when and how to coordinate

This paper examines the potential and the impact of introducing learning capabilities into autonomous agents that make decisions at run-time about which mechanism to exploit in order to coordinate their activities. Specifically, the efficacy of learning is evaluated for making the decisions that are involved in determining when and how to coordinate. Our motivating hypothesis is that to deal wi...

From Rational to Emotional Agents

This paper presents the Emotional-Belief-DesireIntention architecture which reflects humans’ practical reasoning by adding the influence of primary and secondary emotions into the decision making process of a traditional BDI architecture. Our architecture handles bounded resources by using primary emotions as the first filter for adjusting the priority of beliefs, thereby allowing the agents to...

Using Pareto optimality to coordinate distributed agents

Pareto optimality is a domain-independent property that can be used to coordinate distributed engineering agents. Within a model of design called Redux, some aspects of dependency-directed backtracking can be interpreted as tracking Pareto optimality. These concepts are implemented in a framework, called Next-Link, that coordinates legacy engineering systems. This framework allows existing soft...