ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk-taking how this is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power incentives within US companies. We find that ESG decreases based both accounting-based market-based returns. Further, we more effective in mitigating than a firm with powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG-incentivized engagement bonuses weaken impacts reducing types risk-taking. Our analysis helps understanding different trade-offs aligning all stakeholders' benefits under managerial-related factors.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Financial Management
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1468-036X', '1354-7798']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12447