Études récentes sur Condorcet

Variations sur l'effet Condorcet

When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that margins-based Condorcet methods can elect a Condorcet Loser with non-zero probibility when voters vote tactica...

Condorcet and Communitarianism

Communitarianism is the thesis that it is ultimately the dispositions of a community of speakers that determine the content of a symbol. Boghossian‟s reasons for rejecting this theory turn on the fact that he sees the account as unable to accommodate the normativity of meaning, i.e. the fact that the content of a symbol must exclude parts of the world (application of the symbol to which would t...

Études in non-interactive zero-knowledge

N a ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF [GMR85], Prover interactively convinces Verifier that theorem 7r is true in such a way that (a) a corrupt Prover cannot convince Verifier of a false theorem and (b) a corrupt Verifier cannot "learn" anything other than the fact that r is true. In a NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF [BFM88], the Prover must do the above by sending only a single message to Verifier! To...

Maximal Condorcet Domains

A Condorcet domain is a subset of the set of linear orders on a finite set of candidates (alternatives to vote), such that if voters preferences are linear orders belonging to such a subset, then the simple majority rule does not yield cycles. It is well-known that the set of linear orders LO is the Bruhat lattice. We prove that a maximal Condorcet domain is a distributive sublattice in the Bru...