Event corruption: A game theoretic approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics for Application
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1805-3610,1805-3629
DOI: 10.13164/ma.2018.12