Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

JEL code: C72 keywords: evolution, mutation rates, mistakes ¤The authors are grateful for helpful comments from one referee and one associate editor of this journal, as well as from Sjaak Hurkens, Jens Josephson, Alexander Matros, Arthur Robson, Maria Saez-Marti and Philippe Solal, and participants at seminars at the London School of Economics, the EEA 1999 congress in Santiago di Compostela, a...

Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution

This paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions. Players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network. We show that the architecture of any nontrivial Nash equilibrium is minimally connected, and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game. We apply the model to analyze stochastic stability ...

Compliance with Endogenous Audit Probabilities

Towards a Unified Belief Structure in Games with indeterminate probabilities

This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention is also paid to the decision-theoretic principle known as the thesis of no subjective probability for self-action. Conditions in cope with this principle are...

Incrementally Learned Subjectivist Probabilities in Games

In this paper, we show how our AI opponents learn internal representations of probabilities. We use a Bayesian interpretation of such subjectivist probabilities but do not implement full Bayesian methods of parameter estimation since we wish the AIs to be as human-like as possible. Thus the parameters of the subjectivist probabilities are learned incrementally.