Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occasionally receives opportunities to update his choice of strategy. When such an opportunity arises, the agent selects a strategy that is currently optimal, but only after his payoffs have been randomly perturbed. We prove that the resulting evolutionary process converges to approximate Nash equil...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.011