Evolution of Cooperation: Does Selfishness Restraint Lie within?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution of Cooperation: Does Selfishness Restraint Lie within?
Traditional models of how cooperative strategies succeed in evolution have largely focused on social interactions among individuals and selection acting at kin and group levels. A recent study at the genetic level suggests that cooperation may also be promoted by the evolution of gene-trait relationships that limit the range of possible cheating mechanisms that can evolve.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Current Biology
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0960-9822
DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2005.02.045