Evolution of strategic cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
formation and evolution of regional organizations: the case study of the economic cooperation organization (eco)
abstract because of the many geopolitical, geo economical and geo strategically potentials and communicational capabilities of eco region, members can expand the convergence and the integration in base of this organization that have important impact on members development and expanding peace in international and regional level. based on quality analyzing of library findings and experts interv...
15 صفحه اولStrategic initial placement promotes evolution of cooperation on graphs
1Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 2Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 3Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 4Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 5Department of Mathematics, Harvard Universi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Evolution Letters
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2056-3744,2056-3744
DOI: 10.1002/evl3.164