Evolutionary equilibrium strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
In (Viossat, 2006, “The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria”, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any correlated equilibrium remain. Here, we generalize this result by showing that it holds for an open set of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/0022-5193(79)90365-5