Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games

Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games

Stamatios Katsikas 1,*, Vassili Kolokoltsov 2,3 and Wei Yang 4 1 Centre for Complexity Science, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 2 Department of Statistics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK; [email protected] 3 Institute of Informatics Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IPI RAN), Vavilova, Moscow 119333, Russia 4 Risk Methodology, Santander UK plc, Lond...

Inspection Games

Inspection Games

We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an ‘inspection game’ where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we find that fines are more ef...

Recursive Inspection Games

We consider a sequential inspection game where an inspector uses a limited number of inspections over a larger number of time periods to detect a violation (an illegal act) of an inspectee. Compared with earlier models, we allow varying rewards to the inspectee for successful violations. As one possible example, the most valuable reward may be the completion of a sequence of thefts of nuclear m...

Applications of Inspection Games

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a non-cooperative situation where an inspector verifies that another party, called inspectee, adheres to legal rules. The inspector wishes to deter illegal activity on the part of the inspectee and, should illegal activity nevertheless take place, detect it with the highest possible probability and as soon as possible. The inspectee may have some in...