Evolutionary oligopoly games with cooperative and aggressive behaviors
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with externalities. Due to cognitive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional actions of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value following simple heuristics. In particular, they assign various non-equilibrium probability distributions over the outsiders’ set of partitions. We construct the value function of a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1860-711X,1860-7128
DOI: 10.1007/s11403-020-00298-y