Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Prisoners' Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review E
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1063-651X,1095-3787
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.58.69