Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies
A class of evolutionary selection dynamics is defined, and the defining property, convex monotonicity, is shown to be sufficient and essentially necessary for the elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies. More precisely: (1) all strictly dominated strategies are eliminated along all interior solutions in all convex monotonic dynamics, and (2) for all selection dynamics where the pure-s...
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An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strongly dominated relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominated relative to their knowle...
متن کاملWeakly Dominated Strategies: a Mystery Cracked
An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strongly dominated relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominated relative to their knowle...
متن کاملWeakly Dominated Strategies: a Mystery Cracked
An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strictly dominanted relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominanted relative to their know...
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We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements does not eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009