Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Feasibility/Desirability Games for Normal Form Games, Choice Models and Evolutionary Games
An abstraction of normal form games is proposed, called Feasibility/Desirability Games (or FD Games in short). FD Games can be seen from three points of view: as a new presentation of games in which Nash equilibria can be found, as choice models in microeconomics or as a model of evolution in games.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2171774