Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Stability Against Multiple Mutations
It is known (see e.g. Weibull (1995)) that ESS is not robust against multiple mutations. In this article, we introduce robustness against multiple mutations and study some equivalent formulations and consequences.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2153-0785,2153-0793
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0051-x