Ex ante Randomization in Agency Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ex ante Randomization in Agency Models
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...
متن کاملEx - ante and ex - post strong correlated
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy pro le that is immune to joint deviations. Di erent notions of strong correlated equilibria were de ned in the literature. One major di erence among those de nitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated pro le. In this paper we prov...
متن کاملEx-Ante Evaluation of Policy Reforms using Behavioral Models
The tools for policy evaluation and analysis reviewed in the preceding chapters are all ex-post, as they essentially compare the distribution of welfare over a population before and after a given policy or a given local program is implemented. While ex-post evaluation is essential for assessing the true impacts of existing policies and programs, there are many instances in which policymakers wo...
متن کاملMeasuring Ex-Ante Welfare in Insurance Markets
Estimates of willingness to pay in adversely selected markets tend to understate the ex-ante (or utilitarian) willingness to pay for insurance. This paper derives an ’ex-ante’ willingness to pay curve that measures welfare from behind the veil of ignorance. I provide a strategy to estimate this curve using market choices and costs, combined with a measure of risk aversion. In examples motivated...
متن کاملEx-ante licensing in sequential innovations
The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the form...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2555682