Ex Post Information in Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved in Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [6], according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi field.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2297392