Ex post information rents in sequential screening
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ex post information rents in sequential screening
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequ...
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The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can extract all the equilibrium payoffs at a given Bayesian Game when the players’ information is correlated. For this result to hold, the principal needs to know how informative are the agents’ signals. If the principal does not know how noisy the signal of a player is, or equivalently, when the signals available to a player can be rank...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003