Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project’s cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects both which and how many is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constrai...
متن کاملwww.econstor.eu Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement∗
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project’s cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects both which and how many is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constrai...
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A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer’s objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the B...
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Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an allocation g(x) that satisfies (IC) and (F). We construct a monotonic g̃(x) that preserves constraints (IC) and (F), but increases the principal’s payoff. We have assumed that F has almost everywhere positive density, so F−1 exists. Define S(t) = ∣∣{y : g(F−1(y)) ≤ t}∣∣, t ∈ R+. Note that S is weakly increasing and satisfies S(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t. Define g̃(x) = S−...
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Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a setting where an auctioneer sells a set of items to a buyer in multiple stages. At each stage, there could be multiple items for sale but each item can only appea...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2548543