Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers

Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateral strategies less often under divided government. We consider how legislatures’ ability to retaliate against executives influences unilateralism under inter-branch conflict, arguing that it is conditional on the policymaking capacity of le...

Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan: Presidential Authority and the Separation of Powers

In light of Elena Kagan's nomination to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, this report analyzes then-Professor Kagan's views of executive power and the doctrine of separation of powers as laid most extensively out in her 2001 Harvard Law Review article Presidential Administration. This report will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly describe the constitutio...

ARMENIA'S CONSTITUTION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AMONG THE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT The New System of Separation of Powers

The new Constitution of the Republic of Armenia was adopted by referendum held on July 5, 1995. This represented a historic event for both the people and the state of Armenia. Whereas the adoption of the Constitution and the parliamentary elections were indicative of the thrust to adopt democratic processes, they also laid the foundation of the state system in Armenia by establishing the consti...

The New Separation of Powers