Expectation Dependence: The Banking Firm Under Risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics Research eXpress
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1687-1200,1687-1197
DOI: 10.1093/amrx/abw005