Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation Accessed Terms of Use Detailed Terms Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation *
This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents may improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge across firms. Each firm receives a private signal on the success probability of a research project and decides when and which project to implement. A successful innovation ...
متن کاملSoftware Patents and Innovation
The European Commission has put software patents on its agenda. For the first time in Europe’s history a monopole will be granted by the State on immaterial ideas. The goal of this paper is to introduce the reader to the particular economics of the software sector and to compare the costs and benefits of a market with software patents against the actual situation. For this purpose we’ll explain...
متن کاملExperimentation, Patents, Knowledge Spillovers and Market Incentives
This work addresses the question of what is the optimal patent length in a n rm R&D race with unknown hazard rate, knowledge spillovers and variable e¤ort under general post innovation market structures. Explicit analytical solution for symmetric equilibrium strategies are given. We show that longer patents increase research intensity by increasing the competition within rms. When post innova...
متن کاملSequential innovation, patents, and imitation
We argue that when innovation is “sequential” (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and “complementary” (so that each potential innovator takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such protection. Furth...
متن کاملInnovation Adoption and Collective Experimentation∗
I study a game in which individuals gather costly information about an innovation and share their knowledge through social ties. A person’s incentive to experiment varies with her position in the network, and strategic interactions lead to counterintuitive behavior among the most connected players. The structure of the social network and the distribution of initial beliefs jointly determine lon...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1281703