Exploration of Mined Block Temporarily Holding and Enforce Fork Attacks by Selfish Mining Pool in Proof-of-Work Blockchain Systems

We explored mined block temporarily holding (MBTH) with enforce fork (MBTH-EF) attacks to understand the effect of selfish mining on winning rate and fairness. The temporary time provides a pool additional begin next early. In this situation, may risk losing block. One method maintain probability held is ensure sends out hash values once it receives message from other pools. analyzed MBTH-EF evaluated effects win when how long held. propose competition solution that does not involve actual calculation. It entails using one stochastic target value for batch racing simulation evaluate threshold, periods, time, difficulty, sizes, occurrences according operation data Bitcoin system. Because periodic adjustment difficulty reduces effect, we an intermittent (iMBTH-EF) attack model examined game long-term competition. also identified suitable detection methods future work results.