Export Credit Guarantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of Economic Research

سال: 2004

ISSN: 0307-3378,1467-8586

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2004.00206.x