Extending the characterization of maximum Nash welfare

نویسندگان

چکیده

In the allocation of indivisible goods, maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as only within class additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization all rules.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1873-7374', '0165-1765']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111030