Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper presents a counterexample to the principle that all epistemic reasons for doxastic attitudes towards p are provided by evidence concerning . I begin motivating and clarifying associated picture of reasons, including notion proposition, which comprises both first- second-order evidence. then introduce from incoherent presenting three example cases. In each case, fact subject’s is an reason suspend, not argue this incoherence subject take step back reassess her conflicting attitudes, thus suspend them. Suspending judgment enables revise where appropriate (typically) arrive at set coherent well-supported attitudes. address dilemma my proposal and, in conclusion, briefly suggest on they be understood against background virtuous intellectual conduct.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asian Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2731-4642']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00075-1