F/actual Knowing: Putting Facts and Values in Place

Having Linguistic Rules and Knowing Linguistic Facts

‘Knowledge’ doesn’t correctly describe our relation to linguistic rules. It is too thick a notion (for example, we don’t believe linguistic rules). On the other hand, ‘cognize’, without further elaboration, is too thin a notion, which is to say that it is too thin to play a role in a competence theory. One advantage of the term ‘knowledge’—and presumably Chomsky’s original motivation for using ...

Putting Detectors in Their Place

In this paper, we address the problem of locating detectors in a given program under resource constraints. A detector is a program component that asserts the validity of a predicate in a program. The detector location problem is to identify which program actions need to be monitored by detectors such that certain given dependability properties are met. In this paper, we focus on the following d...

Putting Hierarchy in Its Place

Putting molecules in their place.

Each class of microscope is limited to imaging specific aspects of cell structure and/or molecular organization. However, imaging the specimen by complementary microscopes and correlating the data can overcome this limitation. Whilst not a new approach, the field of correlative imaging is currently benefitting from the emergence of new microscope techniques. Here we describe the correlation of ...

Putting Opacity in its Place

We clarify the relationships between Guerraoui and Kapalka’s opacity correctness condition for Transactional Memory (TM) algorithms and the TMS1 and TMS2 conditions we have previously proposed. Using formal, machine checked simulation proofs constructed using the PVS theorem proving system, we have shown that all algorithms that satisfy opacity also satisfy TMS1, and that all algorithms that sa...