Fair Accumulation under Risky Lifetime
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scottish Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0036-9292
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12008