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Fair welfare maximization
We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations. The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an a priori evaluation of ...
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We study different variants of the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. Assume there are n buyers interested in m items. Indeed they have different valuations on each item, i.e. buyer i has a valuation of wi(j) on item j. In the simplest model, a collection of items S worths ∑ j∈S wi(j) for buyer i; However, in practice, collection of items might have different values than th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.599137