Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fairness versus Efficiency
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutua...
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We consider an asymmetric cyclic polling system with general service-time and switchover time distributions with so-called two-stage gated service at each queue, an interleaving scheme that aims to enforce fairness among the different customer classes. For this model, we (1) obtain a pseudo-conservation law, (2) describe how the mean delay at each of the queues can be obtained recursively via t...
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The term payments for environmental services (PES) has rapidly gained popularity, with its focus on market-based mechanisms for enhancing environmental services (ES). Current use of the term, however, covers a broad spectrum of interactions between ES suppliers and beneficiaries. A broader class of mechanisms pursues ES enhancement through compensation or rewards. Such mechanisms can be analyze...
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Property rights provide incentives to create information but they also provide incentives to hoard it prior to the award of protection. All-or-nothing rights, in particular, limit prior sharing. An unintended consequence is to slow, not hasten, forward progress when innovation hinges on combining disparately owned private ideas. In response, we propose a solution based on a reward definition of...
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Experiments with the ultimatum game—where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a second party on how to split a pie—illustrate that conventional game theory has been wrong in its predictions regarding the simplest of bargaining settings: Even when one party has enormous bargaining power, she may be able to extract all the surplus from trade, because the second party will reject gro...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.442420