Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations

Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations∗

Firm-level evidence suggests that family firms are more apt to honor implicit labor contracts than are widely held firms, making family firms especially successful at winning workers’ loyalty–a trait that is reflected in fewer strikes and lower unionization rates. Accordingly, we might expect to see more family ownership in countries in which labor relations, for cultural or historical reasons,...

Family Firms , Paternalism , and Labor Relations ∗ Holger

Using firm-, industry-, and country-level data, we document a link between family ownership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are difficult, consistent with firm-level evidence suggesting that family firms are particularly effective at coping with difficult labor relations. Our cross-country re...

Family Firms and Labor Relations

Empirical evidence suggests that family ownership has important implications for economic growth. Several studies find that family firms—at least secondand later-generation family firms in which the chief executive officer (CEO) is a family member, especially if CEO succession is based on primogeniture—perform relatively poorly (e.g., Francisco Pérez-González 2006; Morten Bennedsen et al. 2007;...

Simulating Dynamic Capabilities and Value Creation in Family Firms: Is Paternalism an ‘Asset’ or ‘Liability’?

Labor-managed Firms

Although the traditional theory of the firm gave little attention to institutional detail, the common assumption about the units that engage in the production and sale of goods and services was that they are owned and controlled by individuals who provide risk-bearing capital and who hire the services of workers as one among several variable inputs. Worker-run cooperatives had existed in small ...