Family involvement, firm size, and performance of private-owned enterprises

Family involvement, firm size, and performance of private-owned enterprises

The debate over the effect of “family involvement” on the performance of private enterprises has existed for a long time. However, most previous research ignored the organizational characteristics. In this paper, we incorporate one of the basic organizational characteristics—firm size—into our analysis by using data from a nationwide sample survey of private enterprises. From the two dimensions...

The impact of State Ownership on Earning Quality: A Comparison Between Private-owned Enterprises and State-owned Enterprises in China

Slack and the performance of state-owned enterprises

Organizational slack has been recognized as critical to firm performance, although its impact is not always positive. Slack may be used to fuel innovation or alternatively excess resources may be squandered on pet projects. However, most research on slack is rooted in studying private firms in developed economies, especially the United States. Whether prior research on organizational slack can ...

Corporate Governance Provisions, Family Involvement, and Firm Performance in Publicly Traded Family Firms

This study examines the moderation effects of corporate governance provisions on the link between family involvement (i.e., family ownership and family management) in publicly-traded firms and firm performance by drawing upon agency theory, with a focus on principal-principal agency issues, and the extant family governance literature. We develop and test the hypotheses on 386 of the S&P 500 fir...

Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven’t Worked

Written contracts between governments and state enterprises have been widely used in World Bank projects since the first Bank operation supporting performance contracts, a 1975 operation in Senegal. A Bank survey of developing countries found 565 such contracts in thirty-two countries, and another 103,000 in China as of June 1994 (World Bank 1995). Although these performance contracts go by dif...