Farsighted house allocation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Farsighted House Allocation
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.006