Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games
Two player normal form game is the most basic form of game, studied extensively in game theory. Such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices (A,B), one for each player, hence they are also known as bimatrix games. The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as the rank of matrix (A+B). For zero-sum games, i.e., rank-0, von Neumann (1928) [13] showed that Nash equilibrium are min-max s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0030-364X,1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.1981