Fatalism and Future Contingents

Future Contingents and Relative Truth

If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet i...

Three-valued Logic and Future Contingents

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Bourne on Future Contingents and Three-valued Logic

Recently, Bourne constructed a system of three-valued logic that he supposed to replace à Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic in view of the problems of future contingents. In this paper, I will show first that Bourne’s system makes no improvement to à Lukasiewicz’s system. However, finding some good motivations and lessons in his attempt, next I will suggest a better way of achieving his original...

Partial and paraconsistent approaches to future contingents in tense logic

Bourne on Future Contingents and Three - valued Logic ∗ Daisuke Kachi

Recently, Bourne constructed a system of three-valued logic that he supposed to replace à Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic in view of the problems of future contingents. In this paper, I will show first that Bourne’s system makes no improvement to à Lukasiewicz’s system. However, finding some good motivations and lessons in his attempt, next I will suggest a better way of achieving his original...