Favoritism Under Social Pressure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Theory of Favoritism under International Oligopoly
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economics and Statistics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0034-6535,1530-9142
DOI: 10.1162/0034653053970267