Feedback Stackelberg--Nash Equilibria in Mixed Leadership Games with an Application to Cooperative Advertising
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pricing and Advertising Decisions in a Three-level Supply Chain with Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative Games
Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced ...
متن کاملpricing and advertising decisions in a three-level supply chain with nash, stackelberg and cooperative games
pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. this paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. the amount of market demand is influenced by pri...
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Game Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) is a branch of applied mathematics and economics that studies situations (games) where self-interested interacting players act for maximizing their returns; therefore, the return of each player depends on his behaviour and on the behaviours of the other players. Game Theory, which plays an important role in the social and political sciences, has rec...
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We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability o...
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representing the players act as rational players, i.e. they act to maximise their expected utility in each match of a game, and if such agents play k matches of the game they will converge in playing one of the Nash Equilibria of the game. SALENE can be conceived as a heuristic and efficient method to compute at least one Nash Equilibria in a non-cooperative game represented in its normal form.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0363-0129,1095-7138
DOI: 10.1137/17m1153212