Fiat money in a pairwise-trading, multi-good, overlapping generations model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Money and Market Incompleteness in Overlapping Generations Models
This paper investigates the extent to which the character of equilibria in stochastic overlapping generations models stems from the model’s generic market incompleteness. In addition, it addresses the question of whether money serves to complete markets in these models. We show that money does not complete markets in the sense of expanding the set of state-contingent commodities that an individ...
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† I thank Randall Wright and an anonymous referee for very useful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. Abstract There are two general ways in which the role of fiat money has been introduced in the standard monetary search-theoretical model. The first is to bring in the model a fiat object with different intrinsic properties. The second is to introduce a centralized institution that f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90106-e