Field Evidence on Individual Behavior & Performance in Rank-Order Tournaments
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Field Evidence on Individual Behavior & Performance in Rank-Order Tournaments
Economic analysis of rank-order tournaments has shown that intensi ied competition leads to declining performance. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals in tournament-type contests perform less well on average in the presence of larger number of competitors in total and superstars. Particularly in ield settings, studies often lack direct evidence about the underlying mechanisms, such...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2127310