Financial Crises and Monetary Expansion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Crises: Prevention, Correction, and Monetary Policy
The financial crisis that surfaced in 2007 has stressed the need to identify the ultimate sources of the incentives that were behind the preceding credit and housing bubbles. To lower the likelihood of future financial collapses, prudent economic policies as well as an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework for financial institutions are required. Monetary policy, in turn, should be dire...
متن کاملFinancial Crises, Unconventional Monetary Policy Exit Strategies, and Agents’ Expectations
This paper studies the implications of exit strategies from unconventional monetary policy. Using a Markov switching DSGE model with financial frictions, agents in the model have rational expectations about the probability of financial crises, the probability of an unconventional response to crises, and the exit strategy used. Selling offassets quickly produces a double-dip recession; in contra...
متن کاملInternational Monetary Fund and financial crises in the global economy
The rapidly evolving global economy as well as new challenges with economic and social implications make the problem of financial crises, including currency crises, extremely important in the current situation. Especially given the fact that the crises affect various countries and regions of the world. Serious currency crashes have occurred in developing countries with marked structural problem...
متن کاملFinancial Crises and Political Crises∗
The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...
متن کاملAppendix to "Financial Crises and Political Crises"
PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2255946