Financial instability, political crises and contagion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Crises and Political Crises∗
The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...
متن کاملFinancial globalization, financial crises and contagion
Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. nonfinancial sectors since the mid 1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset market...
متن کاملAppendix to "Financial Crises and Political Crises"
PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...
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A number of contradictory metaphors are interwoven with network culture. Perhaps the most striking is the computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee’s image of a spider’s web, which is used to represent the open interstices of communication, but also raises questions about network vulnerability. For example, is being on the web tantamount to the experience of a spider or a fly? Indeed, the World Wide W...
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The most recent generation of currency and nancial crisis literature blames the borrowing decisions of real and nancial sector actors; in particular, it argues that the de facto dollarization of liabilities is inherently risky and can trigger a host of economic ills that impede economic development. This paper presents and tests an institutional theory of de facto nancial dollarization. It argu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Recherches économiques de Louvain
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0770-4518,1782-1495
DOI: 10.3917/rel.734.0347