Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Intermediation
The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in capital markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities. The prices o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937x.00151