Financing a Nationalized Monopoly: Coase's Versus Hotelling-Lerner's Solution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Investment Frictions versus Financing Frictions
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Finance Review
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1091-1421,1552-7530
DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600406