Financing and corporate growth under repeated moral hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financing and Corporate Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Intermediation
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1042-9573
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2009.12.001