Fines, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: Evidence from Antitrust Experiments

Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact ...

Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms∗

We provide an economic analysis of the incentives created by an antitrust leniency program, with particular attention to incentives created for effort directed at the concealment of collusion. The results point to a need for competition authorities to consider the effects of concealment when evaluating economic evidence of collusion. The results also suggest possible benefits from increasing pe...

Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment∗

JEL Classification: K42, L13, O17.

Organized Crime Goes Cyber

Policing organized crime

Until a few decades ago, the police were mainly a reactive bureaucratic organization that moved from one criminal event to the next, according to the degree to which the outside world required its services. Since then the police have abandoned the emphasis on law enforcement with regards to petty crime and public order. More recently the police have developed community policing as an important ...