First Principles, Fallibilism, and Economics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions
Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism. The challenge facing the non-contextualist advocate of fallibilism is t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2901539