Flow auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market Structure and the Flow of Information In Repeated Auctions
There is an ongoing public policy debate regarding vertical integration and its concomitant information flows. Of particular concern is that the information derived by an auctioneer (such as a distributor) will be shared with its integrated bidder (such as a manufacturer), leading to a reduction in competition between the bidders. Similar competitive concerns arise regarding bid revelation poli...
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In this paper we address the problem of (1) representing bids for combinatorial auctions and (2) employing those structures for “reasoning”. We propose a graph-based language who’s novelty lies (1) in the use of generalized network flows to represent the bids and (2) in the interpretation of winner determination as an adequate aggregation of individual preferences. We motivate the language both...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3